Operation Beit-Ol-Moqaddas

 place with historical importance, historical layer / disappeared object

Starting point of an Iranian military offensive, which took place from 24 May to 22 April 1982, in the direction of "Road 37" (14km distance from the Karun river) connecting Ahvaz to Khoramshahr with the objective of flanking, destroying along the way and splitting the forces of the Iraqi occupiers in half, disrupting supplies and logistics of the remaining Iraqi forces in the sector close to Ahvaz and Hoveyzeh and entrapping them for a final two pronged pincer movement by the Iranian troops.

The Iranians transported troops across the Karun river and embarked on the western side and began fighting their way westwards while an offensive was set off simultaneously Southwest of Ahvaz with the purpose of clinching the main Iraqi frontline in order to prevent the Iraqis from turning around to flank the Iranian troops that were operating in the south and/or reinforcing the positions of friendly troops in the rear that were under assault. Iraqi occupying troops were shocked when they discovered that they were being attacked in an area and from an angle where they least expected it.

Previous deception operations conducted by Iranian troops farther north near Ahvaz had tricked Iraqi planners into thinking that the Iranians would make one single major thrust and that it would come along an axis between Ahvaz and Hoveyzeh southwards towards Khoramshahr. Additionally, the Iraqi high command was of the notion that the only other viable route to Khoramshahr for the Iranians would be to stage an attack from Abadan, which had been freed from occupying Iraqi troops in September 1981. The Iranians employed human wave assaults which shocked the Iraqis who had no prior experience with and had never faced such kind of warfare before, and had not yet developed tactics to deal with such type of assaults - thus highly inspired and motivated Iranians, with overwhelming numbers, zealously stormed through Iraqi fortified positions, revetments, trenches and dugouts resulting in massive Iraqi casualties and a subsequent Iraqi route/retreat, before finally reaching the highway.

The Iraqi high command felt that the real acute threat to their hold on Khoramshahr was from an imaginary Iranian assault coming out of Abadan. For that reason the Iraqi troops had readied themselves to fight a time consuming urban battle, just as they had done many months earlier where they fought for 34 days before the Iranian resistance crumbled completly, and had envisioned that the Iranians would attempt to push into Khoramshahr from the south, therefor they had geared all their defensive efforts into denying the Iranians entry into the city specifically from that direction. In which case the Iraqis would have easily been able to re-supply the troops that were inside the city and send in reinforcements from a secure rear. Instead the occupiers within the city found themselves encircled and forced to fight from unprepared positions. Moreover, upon hearing news of the retreat of their own forces, that had been tasked with holding the area north of Khoramshahr and Road 37, the morale of the forces that were stationed inside the city plummeted which led to a quick and massive Iraqi surrendering.

Shortly after the conclusion of this operation, Saddam Hussein ordered the withdrawal of all remaining Iraqi forces in the northern sector. He issued them to cross back into Iraq and to position themselves behind the International border. Now, the only part of Iran still in Iraqi hands was an area called Schalamcheh...